Amit A. Batabyal: Schumpeterian Creative Class Competition, Innovation Policy, and Regional Economic Growth
Amit A. Batabyal '87 is the Arthur J. Gosnell Professor of Economics at the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT). He uses microeconomic theory and mathematical techniques to model and to better understand problems in natural resource, environmental, and regional economics.
Batabyal has published more than 600 papers, books, book chapters, and book reviews in a variety of refereed scholarly outlets in ecology, economics, mathematics, operations research, and political science. He is the recipient of numerous awards including the Geoffrey J. D. Hewings Award from the North American Regional Science Council in 2003, the Moss Madden Memorial Medal from the British and Irish Section of the Regional Science Association International in 2004, the Outstanding Achievement in Research Award from the Society for Range Management in 2006, the Trustees Scholarship Award from the RIT Board of Trustees in 2007, and the Mattei Dogan Foundation Prize from the International Social Science Council in 2013. He is an honorary member of the Regional Science Association International's Japan Section and a fellow of the Regional Studies Association.
Batabyal obtained a B.S. with honors and distinction in applied economics and business management from Cornell in 1987, an M.S. in agricultural and applied economics from the University of Minnesota in 1990, and a Ph.D. in agricultural and resource economics from the University of California–Berkeley in 1994.
Batabyal focuses on a region that is creative as described by Richard Florida. The creative class is broadly composed of existing and candidate entrepreneurs. The general question the class analyzes concerns the effects of Schumpeterian competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs on economic growth and innovation policy in this region. The class performs four specific tasks. First, when the flow rate of innovation function for the existing entrepreneurs is strictly concave, we delineate the circumstances in which competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs leads to a unique balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium. Second, the class examines whether it is possible for the BGP equilibrium to involve different levels of R&D expenditures by the existing entrepreneurs. Third, they show how the BGP equilibrium is altered when the flow rate of innovation function for the existing entrepreneurs is constant. Finally, they study the impact that taxes and subsidies on R&D by existing and candidate entrepreneurs have on R&D expenditures and regional economic growth.