THE EFFECTS OF EUROCENTRIC POLICY-MAKING ON ITALIAN - NORTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the College of Architecture, Art, and Planning of Cornell University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Science with Honors

by
Da-Eun Lee
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Thomas J. Campanella
This Thesis is Approved by:

Da-Eun Lee

Thomas J. Campanella

Faculty Advisor
ABSTRACT

Throughout history, migrations have been considered within the realms of the rise and fall of governments, exchange of ideas, and policies implemented. These are especially useful in the consideration of the current migration crisis in Europe, following the 2011 Arab Spring that has unsettled North Africa and the Middle East. While it seems migratory patterns have changed throughout the decades, the reception of African migrants in Italy has remained relatively consistent, perhaps due to a history of subordination of African migrants, from slavery to colonization. The ways that migrants have been poorly assimilated into the workforce, culture, and education system, and the negative depiction of migrants in media, have contributed to growing racism and xenophobia towards foreigners in Italy. An analysis of Italian migration reveals a Eurocentric policy-making process with a heavy concentration on securitization over humanitarianism.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Da-Eun (Donna) Lee is a senior at Cornell University, and she will graduate in May 2016 with a Bachelor of Science in Urban and Regional Studies and a minor in Business. Da-Eun was born in Seoul, Republic of Korea, and grew up in Tenafly, New Jersey. Da-Eun is involved in several organizations on campus, including AIESEC International, Forte Foundation, and the Cornell International Affairs Society. She is primarily interested in the policy implications of urban planning, and has conducted research on education systems in rural areas. She hopes to pursue post-graduate studies in urban studies with a focus on policy analysis.
Dedicated to my parents, who have encouraged me every step of the way.
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Introduction

Throughout history, human migration has been integral to the rise and fall of empires, the spread of religion, and the exchange of ideas. Italy’s crucial location in Southwest Europe and proximity to Libya has long made it a major route for migrants from across the African continent, especially Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Commonly referred to as the Central Mediterranean Route, it has transformed the region for centuries, and has gained renewed attention in recent years following the Arab Spring of 2011. The following study of migration in Italy tackles a subject in a state of flux, and thus confronts the manifold challenges of what Michel Foucault has called “history of the present.” Situating an analysis within the present is inherently difficult, especially when considering the effective ways in which migration policies operate in response to migration. This kind of analysis, though difficult, is useful in marking continuities with—and discontinuities from—previous events in migration. Through what Foucault describes as “cartography in the making,” we are able to follow internal transformations and the political restructuring of Italy, as well as the implications of migration on the rest of the European Union.”1 As Foucault described the process, “I set out from a problem expressed in the terms current today and I try to work out its genealogy. Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present.”2 In a similar manner, I have laid out a chronological history of Italian migratory patterns, past policies implemented, and reactions from both the migrants and the Italians, in order to gauge the effectiveness of current migration policies.

1 Martina Tazzioli. Border Displacements. Challenging the Politics of Rescue between Mare Nostrum and Triton (Migration Studies 4, no 1, 2016), 1-19.
Pre-Arab Spring History

Roman Empire

The Roman Empire was the most powerful economic, political, and military powers of the ancient world, spanning at its peak three continents and forty different current countries. These include nearly all of present-day Europe and much of North Africa—today's Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria. Writings by Augustine of Hippo and others indicate that the Roman Empire was engaged in trading slaves as early as the fifth century BCE. While Augustine lamented that slave dealers “seem to be draining Africa of much of its human population and transferring their ‘merchandise’ to the provinces across the sea,” it’s clear that there was an established physical route and historical connection that had existed between Italy and North Africa for a very long time.³

Italian City States

Following almost 500 years of imperial rule, the Roman Empire fragmented into a constellation of autonomous city-states. During the middle ages, the primary source of African immigration into Southern Europe was through the slave trade. African slaves were employed in southern Italian city-states for domestic service and plantation labor on Mediterranean islands and on the Iberian Peninsula.⁴ While Europeans had traditionally used their captured compatriots and servants from Eastern Europe as slaves, especially in areas with sugar cane, African slaves began to replace Eastern slaves when established slave trade routes were rendered inaccessible following the expansion of Turkey.

Generally, African slaves were not treated as harshly as captive Muslims, largely because they were expected to convert readily to Catholicism.\(^5\)

The first non-European immigrants in Italy—
from several countries including the former Italian colony of Eritrea—were mostly employed in housekeeping, while Tunisian migrant workers were used to harvest tomatoes in Southern Italy.\(^6\) The growth of Islamic military power around the 1500s prompted an increase in the purchase of African slaves by Christian traders, due to difficulty of access to Black Sea slave markets.\(^7\) During the 200-year period between the 1440s and the 1640s, the Portuguese brought hundreds of thousands of West African slaves into Italy and Iberia.\(^8\) This history of slavery sets a background context that establishes the existence of Africans in Europe since the Middle Ages.

**Post-Middle Ages**

Between the 1500s and the 2000s, more than 65 million Europeans left Europe for other continents. Between 1815 and 1861, the Italian city-states were unified under the Risorgimento period, and the earliest statistical sources giving a comprehensive overview of Italian emigration dates back to 1876. Despite a large portion of the population emigrating out of Europe, migrants from other countries did not make large-scale movements into the continent until the First World War.\(^9\) As a result, between 1861 and

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\(^{5}\) Pieter C Emmer and Leo Lucassen. *Migration from the Colonies to Western Europe Since 1800* (Mainz: Institute of European History, 2012).


\(^{8}\) Lucassen and Lucassen 2009

\(^{9}\) Emmer and Lucassen 2012
the beginning of World War I in 1914, Italian migratory policies were very liberal.\textsuperscript{10} The first surveys of national returnees from non-European countries were conducted in 1905. While these surveys are not completely reliable, they are useful in revealing broad trends that shed light on migration prior to the 1900s. Early migration showed a steady increase in emigration, from roughly 100,000 expatriations in 1876 to 300,000 by the end of the 19th century. Until 1885, Italians mostly migrated to other European countries, before extending emigration to the United States, Argentina and Brazil. Most early emigrants were from Northern Italy. Between the 1900s and the First World War, there was a sharp increase in migration, with more than 600,000 people emigrating out of Italy, mainly to France, Germany and Switzerland.\textsuperscript{11} Nonetheless, transoceanic migration became increasingly attractive under the pressures of industrialization and changing markets.\textsuperscript{12} At this time, migration from Southern Italy began to match, and eventually exceed, that of Northern Italy.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Colonization Through World War II}

Once the nation was unified during the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Kingdom of Italy, as it was known at the time, sought to acquire colonies as part of the European “Scramble for Africa.”\textsuperscript{14} This was still an era characterized by heavy migration out of Italy, and refugees from non-European areas were rare before World War I.\textsuperscript{15} Italy lagged much of Europe at this time in terms of economic productivity and development.


\textsuperscript{11} C Bonifazi, F Heins, S Strozza, and M Vitiello. \textit{Italy: The Italian Transition from an Emigration to Immigration Country} (IDEA Working Papers, 2009).

\textsuperscript{12} Mark I. Choate. \textit{Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad} (Harvard University Press, 2008).

\textsuperscript{13} Bonifazi et. al 2009

\textsuperscript{14} Choate 2008

\textsuperscript{15} Lucassen and Lucassen 2009
This led by imperialists like Francesco Crispi to advocate for the expansion of Italian territory to overseas colonies that might help relieve overpopulation and unemployment. Italy's African colonization play began with the purchase of Assab. By the beginning of World War II, Italy had acquired a colony in Eritrea, land in Somalia and authority in Turkish Libya. After one unsuccessful attempt to invade Ethiopia, Italy merged it to the older east African colonies to create “Italian East Africa.” The area was called “Quarta Sponda,” the Fourth Shore, and it included Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, parts of what is currently Libya. While Italy was not nearly as strong militarily as Britain, France, or Germany, it had succeeded in joining that exclusive club of colonial regimes.

According to Lucassen, migration to Europe increased significantly during the 20th century for a number of reasons. First, Africans constituted a portion of non-European soldiers and temporary laborers during the two World Wars. Even more migrants responded to a demand for labor when the wars ended. The collapse of colonialism following World War II prompted millions from French, British, Portuguese and Italian Africa to make their way to Europe once their states ceased to exist. The largest of these groups came from French North Africa and Indochina, Portuguese Africa and the Dutch East Indies, as well as British and Belgian colonies of Africa and Asia. Some African migrants, such as those from Algeria, fled because they feared their new governments. Algerians moved to Spain, Italy, Malta, Switzerland, and Germany, and were called *pieds noirs* because “culturally they associated themselves with Europe, while their feet belonged in Africa.”16 Between 1930 and the end of WWII, Mussolini’s Fascist government implemented a strict anti-migration policy, and emigration dropped significantly. Italy saw an inflow of migrants following the cession of territories to Yugoslavia, and the loss of African colonies. According to Bonifazi, 206,000 migrants

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16 Emmer and Lucassen 2012
came to Italy in November of 1949: 55,000 from Ethiopia, 45,000 from Eritrea, 12,000 from Somalia and almost 94,000 from Libya.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Foreigners in Italian censuses, 1871–2001}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Foreign residents & Non-resident foreigners & Total foreigners & Resident Italian population & Foreign residents per 1000 residents & Total foreigners per 1000 residents \\
\hline
1871 & – & – & 60,982 & 27,303,509 & – & 2.2 \\
1881 & – & – & 59,956 & 28,953,480 & – & 2.1 \\
1901 & 37,762 & 23,844 & 61,606 & 32,965,504 & 1.1 & 1.9 \\
1911 & – & – & 79,756 & 35,845,048 & – & 2.2 \\
1921 & 89,517 & 20,923 & 110,440 & 39,943,528 & 2.2 & 2.8 \\
1931 & 83,027 & 54,770 & 137,797 & 41,651,617 & 2.0 & 3.3 \\
1936 & 73,920 & 34,677 & 108,597 & 42,943,602 & 1.7 & 2.5 \\
1951 & 47,177 & 82,580 & 129,757 & 47,515,537 & 1.0 & 2.7 \\
1981 & 210,937 & 109,841 & 320,778 & 56,556,911 & 3.7 & 5.7 \\
1991 & 345,149 & 279,885 & 625,034 & 56,778,031 & 6.1 & 11.0 \\
2001* & 987,363 & 252,185 & 1,239,548 & 56,305,568 & 17.5 & 22.0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnotesize{Source: Italian censuses, various years; * provisional data published at www.istat.it}
\end{table}

\textbf{Figure 1: Foreigner in Italian Censuses 1871 – 2001}
\textit{Source: Colombo and Sciortino 2004}

\textsuperscript{17} Bonfazi et al 2009
Italy’s Transition from Emigration to Immigration Country

During this time, Europeans fleeing extremist regimes found warm reception in Western Europe, setting precedence for a growing number of refugees requesting asylum from oppressive governments, political unrest and civil strife in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Additionally, migrants came to Europe for cultural and educational reasons. When European countries realized that migration from former colonies could increase unemployment and create housing shortages, they began to demand residence permits from post-colonial migrants.18 After the Second World War, Italy was forced to abandon all colonies and protectorates as part of a peace treaty.19 At this time, Italy’s economic conditions followed a basic emigration trend of a “guest workers” permitted to stay for a short period of time. Italy was also characterized by an increase in internal migration-between 1955 and 1970, there were 24.8 million change of address registrations. During this time, other countries around the world also began to tighten their immigration policies, and net migration into Italy balance became positive for the first time in the early 1970s. 20

Labor

After Italy relinquished its colonies in Africa, colonists and citizens of former colonies shaped the prevailing migratory patterns of the post-war era. A gradual growth in immigration began to occur, but it wasn’t until later that the number of immigrants from abroad exceeded the number of Italians leaving Italy.21 In 1968, the Tunisian immigrants arrived in Sicily following Italian entrepreneurs who had gone to Africa for business. The low costs of travel changed a region known for emigration into one that

18 Lucassen 2009  
19 Colombo and Sciortino 2004   
20 Bonifazi et al 2009  
21 Laura Zanfrini. Immigration in Italy (Migration Education 2013) 1-14.
was famous for immigration. Education was another major pull factor from Europe - the status, position and wages that the educated enjoyed made it attractive to Africans. The demand for literary education over technological and vocational education indicates the value that Africans placed on a white-collar job over a blue-collar job. By the 1960s, Eritrean migrants who had served under the colonial government or had ties with Italian families also made the move to Italy. Tunisians who immigrated to Italy worked in fishing and agriculture in Sicily as seasonal workers for local landowners who wanted cheap labor. This resulted in the creation of ethnic enclaves of Tunisians in Western Sicily. These waves of seasonal work attracted other sun-Saharan African countries. The colonial history between Italy and East Africa was cause for several waves of workers for domestic work through work contracts. Immigrants from Senegal and Ghana were hired as unskilled laborers in quarries, steel mills, and factories in Northern Italy. The poor working conditions of migrants and the informal nature of work may have contributed to racist attitudes and unequal opportunities provided to migrants in Italy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.2 - Resident foreign and Italian population (15-64 years) by economic condition, 1991, 2001, 2005 and 2007 (absolute values in thousands)</th>
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<td>Foreign</td>
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<td>Italian</td>
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(a) Average of the last three quarters of the year
Source: calculations from ISTAT data of the censuses [1991 and 2001] and of the Labour Force survey

**Figure 2: Resident Foreign and Italian Population by Economic Condition 1991, 2001, 2005, and 2007**
Source: Bonifazi et al 2009
Most researchers consider Italy to have been the “fallback choice” for other European destinations post World War II, and not until the oil crisis of 1973 did substantial migration into Italy become the norm.\textsuperscript{23} Starting in the late 1970s, the inflow of mostly unauthorized migrants from Third World Countries and Eastern Europe began to increase in Italy.\textsuperscript{24} The surge in migration following the 1973 oil crisis seems contradictory at first glance, because it prompted economic stagnation and industrial restructuring, causing increases in unemployment and decreasing demand for low-skilled labor. However, rather than reducing migration, the crisis pressed more “guest workers” into permanent settlement in receiving countries in Europe. Migrants continued to overstay their permits in the hope that the demand for labor would include employment for the migrants as well.\textsuperscript{25}

The growth of immigration in 1970s and 1980s was overshadowed by the large-scale closure of legal entry points, such that it was very difficult for foreigners to obtain residency permits prior to the 1980s.\textsuperscript{26} The volume of migrants quickly increased in the late 1980s, when around 100,000 people per year were entering Italy, usually without a permit. By 1999, there were 1,400,000 illegal and legal migrants.\textsuperscript{27} Starting in the 1980s, the number of residency permits increased reliably. The first significant growth in legal immigrants occurred with the amnesties of 1986 and 1990, and by 1991 the number of

\textsuperscript{23} Colombo and Sciortino 2004; This information may be skewed because data from the Ministry of the Interior includes expired permits still in the archives, causing overlaps in the numbers of permits.
\textsuperscript{24} Zanfrini 2013
\textsuperscript{25} Hein de Haas. \textit{The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Europe} (Third World Quarterly 29, 2008) 1305–22.
\textsuperscript{26} Colombo and Sciortino 2014
\textsuperscript{27} Zanfrini 2013
residency permits was more than triple that of 1985. The majority of foreign residents at this time were North Africans from, especially, Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal.

While immigrants came to Italy as students, refugees, and self-employed entrepreneurs, Egyptians and Tunisians were known for especially for high levels of entrepreneurship. Immigrants are influenced by previously created migrant pathways – informal networks can connect old and new immigrants in ways that help in finding housing or work. This system of networking amongst migrants is again demonstrated in Khouma’s experience in Italy. Migrants were encouraged by what Hatton and Williamson refer to as the “friends and relatives” effect, which begins with “small streams of pioneers before becoming a migrant flood, as the friends and relatives effect unlocked the economic and demographic fundamentals pushing emigrants out of local labor markets”. This network assistance, regardless of race, has resulted in a steady decrease in the concentration of a particular ethnic group in a one place.

Immigration to Italy at this time was caused by several different reasons, including high migrant fertility rates, unemployment, political conflict, globalized market, low wages, and poor working conditions in African countries. The low transportation costs from northern African countries and the economic opportunities in both Italy and Europe served as pull factors for migrants from all over the African continent. Tunisians began to arrive in Italy starting in the early 1970s, recruited as seasonal farm workers by local landowners seeking cheap labor. This began a trend of

28 Colombo and Sciortino 2004
29 Rusconi, Silvia. *Italy’s Migration Experiences* (Migration Citizen Education. Network Migration in Europe, 2010).
30 Colombo and Sciortino 2004
seasonal work that linked sub-Saharan African countries to Italy. At the turn of the century, Africans began to enter the country to do domestic and industrial work: specifically, immigrants from Senegal and Ghana were hired as unskilled laborers in factories and quarries. It is also important to note that before 2002, the number of claims for asylum in Italy had been low in comparison to other European countries. While it is tempting to see African migration to Europe as a desperate people fleeing poverty and warfare, it’s vital to remember that the demand for cheap migrant labor was a primary reason for migration. This is an especially important factor to keep in mind when considering the Eurocentric nature of European immigration policies.

**Immigration Policies**

As for immigration policy during the post-war period, Italy's prevailing lack of regulation contributed greatly to the influx of African migrants. The absence of specific immigration policies meant immigrants who arrived beginning in the late 1970s could not become regular citizens, nor could they be expelled. African immigrants could work in the informal economy undocumented, until the 1980s when Italian politicians recognized the issues that arose from the undefined legal entities of the refugees. The policies drafted in the mid-1980s were more a response to “urgency factors” than a well-considered comprehensive migration policy, as Italy was forced to make a quick adjustment from a place of emigration to one of immigration. Undocumented migrants could remain in Italy without legal status but also without the threat of expulsion, until being an undocumented migrant was criminalized in 2008. Between 1992 and 2002, the number of foreigners in Italy increased by 264%. Until 1998, Italian national migratory policies focused on

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33 Colombo and Sciortino 2004
34 De Haas 2008
regularization of irregular migrants and border control.\textsuperscript{35} Some African migrants were treated with disrespect even after they received their papers, because of the association of migrants with criminal activity.\textsuperscript{36} This initial disdain for the newcomers contributed to the discriminatory treatment and indifference towards Africans during the post-Arab Spring migrations.

As Italy quickly adapted to being an immigration country, several pieces of legislation were introduced and passed as regularization programs to accommodate and account for all of the newcomers. Prior to the first immigration law in 1986, immigration was governed by administrative regulations and Benito Mussolini’s Fascist Public Safety Laws enacted in 1931. Aliens could be deported for criminal convictions, failing to comply with the “public order,” while previously deported aliens who re-entered Italy were subject to imprisonment. Administrative regulations between 1931 and 1986 included a sharp reduction in the amount of time one could spend in Italy.\textsuperscript{37} The migration restrictions, stricter visa requirements, and border control protocols interrupted the circular nature of migration prior to the 1970s, and increased the number of undocumented migrations into the EU through Italy. African guest workers began to overstay their visas and stayed permanently as unauthorized migrants. As a result of the burgeoning population of undocumented workers, Southern European nations like Italy and Spain were forced to grant legal status to large numbers of migrants through successive regularization campaigns.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{36} Khouma 2010

\textsuperscript{37} Erin Komada. \textit{Turned Away: The Detrimental Effect of Italy’s Public Security Law on Undocumented Children’s Right to Education} (Boston University International Law Journal 29, no. 451) 452–74.

\textsuperscript{38} De Haas 2008
The first legalization in 1986, Law 943/86, was introduced as a comprehensive migration policy. But while it addressed equal work for equal pay and granted foreign workers access to social services and welfare, it failed to address autonomous work or reform external control and security procedures. The act regulated the entry, residence, and employment of immigrants through regularization applications counted by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labor. It limited the number of immigrants by the number of available jobs, granted legal workers the same rights as Italian workers, and established punishments for illegal employment and human trafficking. It also allowed legally employed foreigners to bring spouses and children into Italy. During this decade, Spain and Italy became more popular destinations for Moroccan migrants as a result of rising demand for unskilled labor in the fields of agriculture and construction. Fewer than 120,000 migrants were legalized, but less than half were able to hold a labor contract, because migrants were often unable to prove their employment.

In 1990, Law 39/90, also known as the Martelli Law, extended a very lenient amnesty to foreigners in Italy before December 31, 1989 in order to count how many illegal foreigners were actually in Italy. The purpose of the law was to “integrate immigrants into the labor force” and “fight illegal immigration by enhancing control procedures and sending back all those without valid documents.” The first comprehensive immigration legislation, the Martelli Law repealed several of Mussolini’s anti-migration measures. Non-citizens were required to obtain a visa, and border officials were allowed to refuse entry to anyone lacking financial support or posing a potential threat to public

39 Rusconi 2010
40 Komada 2011
41 De Haas 2008
43 Russell King and Jacqueline Andall, The Geography and Economic Sociology of Recent Immigration to Italy (Modern Italy 4, no. 2 1999) 135–58.
safety. The law also extended the time period for requesting a stay-permit, and officials who denied the permit request had to provide a written explanation.\footnote{Komada 2011} Nearly 94 percent of applicants were accepted, and beneficiaries were allowed to register in job centers and renew their permits as long as they were employed. However, because the Martelli Law only accounted for those who were employed, many women who came for family reasons had to register as unemployed.

The Martelli Law introduced visa requirements from other countries and reformed deportation procedures for illegal immigrants in correspondence with the Schengen process.\footnote{King and Andall 1999} It also changed Italian Refugee Policy by permitting illegal immigrants who were self-employed to obtain legal status if they satisfied government enrollment and education requirements, and were from a country that offered the same right of self-employment to Italian citizens. It did not, however, strengthen immigration control because Italy’s immigration laws were comparatively weaker than those of neighboring countries, so illegal immigration continued to grow. The 1995 Dini Decree subsequently amended the Martelli Law by allowing foreigners to challenge deportation, requiring them to be employed, extending entry and stay provisions for seasonal workers, and stepping up punishment for illegal entry and trafficking. Implementation of the Decree revealed the politics of migrant reception: the Church and the left urged for increased tolerance, while the right suggested immediate expulsion of undocumented foreigners.\footnote{Komada 2011}

The Turco-Napolitano Law, introduced in 1998, extended regularization to all immigrants who could prove that they were living in Italy prior to passage of the new law. The application process was simplified, and the pool of beneficiaries increased.\footnote{Bonifazi et al 2009} The goals were to provide full rights for documented aliens and basic rights for
undocumented aliens, by implementing more effective planning for migrants seeking employment, preventing illegal immigration, and better integrating legal foreign residents, by forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, ethnic origin, or religion.\textsuperscript{48} The center-right government introduced the important 2002 Bossi Fini Act as an amendment to the Turco-Napolitano Law to uncover illegal foreign work, so it is called the “great regularization.” The law included several specific provisions for entry into the country, including a set number of allowed non-EU workers each year, a specific immigration in each province of Italy, a limit of two years for residence permits via employment, and consequences for illegal immigrants should they be caught by police. Both trade unions and employers’ associations harshly criticized the rigidity of the law; Bossi Fini made it impossible to regularize immigrant workers who have received a deportation order but stay in Italy. It’s clear that despite all of these different measures taken to address immigrant inflow, there has been continual negative feedback on measures taken thus far.\textsuperscript{49}

While Italy signed the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees in 1954 with a geographic condition that only Europeans could apply for asylum, it wasn’t until 1990 that the provision was extended to all nationalities.\textsuperscript{50} Italy was one of the first twelve signatories for the Dublin Regulation in 1997. The regulation was revised in 2003 and again in 2013 with extra provisions and reforms. The Dublin Regulation sets a hierarchy of criteria for asylum claims in Europe, in order to make sure that member states are responsible for the examination of an asylum application. The regulation established that an application could be rejected if it had been received by another EU member state—thus preventing multiple asylum claims and ensuring standards of safety and efficiency.

\textsuperscript{48} Komada 2011
\textsuperscript{50} Rusconi 2010
for asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{51} It is extremely important that this process of seeking asylum has been formalized, especially now, as thousands of immigrants flow into Italy each day, seeking political asylum from tumultuous governments.

The pre-established quota established in 1995 regulated and legitimized immigration while stemming the inflow of migrants to Italy for a short while. In 2006, over 582,000 applications were submitted, with Moroccans making up more than 10% of these applicants. Despite this, rejected applications consisted mostly of young African males working in Southern Italy. As immigrants continued to flow into the country, more immigrants began settling and finding regular jobs in the Central-Northern Italy.\textsuperscript{52} The Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs estimates that between 60 and 75 percent of irregular aliens in Italy entered legally, but overstayed their permits, looking for family reunification and employment.\textsuperscript{53} The European response to an increase in immigration has been to tighten immigration requirements and border controls, and generally make it difficult for African migrants to exist legally in the EU.

In 2009, the Maroni decree, also known as the Security Package, was issued, increasing the punishment for rape, and increasing the length of time an immigrant may be detained while an asylum request is being processed. Law 94/2009 was passed shortly thereafter to increase sanctions against undocumented migrants in Italy by formally making illegal immigration a criminal offense, increasing detention time to six months, increasing monetary fines, and requiring citizen documentation. The shift from integration to deterrence between the Turco-Napolitano law and law 94/2009 was marked and noticeable, such that the Church and human rights groups protested. The draconian measures of this law were defended as necessary because of an unmanageable amount of immigrants. Most of the measures taken by this law were legal under national and

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Dublin Regulation} - European Council on Refugees and Exiles \\
\textsuperscript{52}Bonifazi et al 2009 \\
\textsuperscript{53}Komada 2011
international law because-- according to the Treaty of Lisbon--the state holds exclusive legislative power regarding immigration and national security.

Reception

According to Saskia Sassen, “just as citizenship provides a privileged perspective from which to view the changing structure of laws as well as their quality, immigration is a lens through which we can understand the strains and contradictions in nation-state membership.” In this sense, reception to immigration in Italy demonstrates the contradictory facets of Italy’s colonial past and postcolonial future. Prior to the Arab Spring, public discourse was such that “foreigners” and “immigrants” were already heavily stigmatized. Foreigners were seen as well-off expatriates or upper middle class, while immigrants were seen as unskilled workers, exiles, refugees, and domestic help. In addition, as time passed, there was an increase in newspaper reports about the criminality of immigrants.54 Aside from geographical proximity and a migratory chain, migrants chose Italy as their destination because it was “thought to be easy to find a well-paid job in a rich society with a high standard of living; Italian people were thought to be tolerant and not racist; it was considered easy to enter and even easier to stay.”55 While this may have been true in the past, the opportunities for earning began to diminish as the number of migrants increased, and as a result, Italian perception of migrants took a negative turn.

In today’s society, racial boundaries are blurred. For the purpose of this analysis, racialization is summarized as the “effects that Western discourses of race have on the social fabric of a multiplicity of institutional and non-institutional practices and discourses oriented toward a representation of differences between races.” This is a phenomena especially pronounced within the scenario of the colonial heritage of nation-

54 Sciortino and Colombo 2004
55 Reyneri 2010
The perception of African immigrants must be analyzed from the perspective of both the sending and receiving countries. While the failure of the European Labor Market provided African workers work opportunities, to Europeans, admission of African migrants disrupted European institutions, social structure, and environment. The discourse about African interference, a long history of African slavery, and the alarmist nature of most reports resulted in a Western perception of Africans as “sub-humans.” European reluctance to recognize the humanity of African people shows that Africans represented an inferior race, barbarian to the superior European. The characterization of African migrants as slaves, prior to the “Europe of the migrant’s dream,” rendered many Africans second-class citizens, subject to mild to intense xenophobia from Europeans. This is further demonstrated in Italy’s post-colonial relations with former colonies, Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia and Libya. Migrants’ awareness of domination, resistances to assimilation in Italian society, and pre-existing power structures in Italy have contributed to the relations between Italians and African migrants.

Race in Italy has physical, cultural, and historical implications, and is demonstrated by microaggressions and explicit acts of discrimination, inferiorization, and segregation. A few incidents of this behavior are demonstrated in the way that politicians that represent Lega Nord, the right-wing party in Italy, have defended racist incidents as “having nothing to do with racism.” The city of Padua once decided to build a wall to enclose a public housing complex for migrant people, specifically for the purpose of segregating the migrants from the rest of the neighborhood. The mayor justified his decision that it was not, in fact, racism, but motivated by a desire to maintain public order. There have been accounts of shootings targeting African people and African


agricultural workers, which eventually escalated to several African riots. A center-left political scientist, Giovanni Sartori, has defended Lega Nord as not a racist party, saying they are expressing what he calls “local normal xenophobia.” This kind of implicit racism from government figures perpetuates the normalization of racist attitudes in Italy.  

**Informal Workforce**

Analyzing the effects of wages and employment in Italy is difficult due to the informal nature of the economy, in which a large number of immigrants work and reside furtively. Research suggests that there is little competition between irregular and native labor, despite a depressive effect on agricultural wages, implying direct relationships between immigrant labor, rapid growth in the informal sector, and a highly segmented labor market. Most migrants work in high labor, low innovation, and low productivity growth sectors, such that labor costs may undermine economic profit. In Italy, the regular labor cost ladder is narrow, and minimum wages are high, so the creation of an irregular labor market is the only way to adjust labor costs such that indirect costs and direct wages are shrunk. The thriving informal economy has contributed to the misconception of migrants as stealing Italian jobs and the negative perception that accompanies migrants in the workforce. As costs for social services grow, so does the view that they should be reserved for Italians, even though foreigners pay taxes and contributions. The existence of an informal workforce in Italy results in a self-reinforcing cycle of welfare and fiscal crisis leading to a growth in irregular jobs, which the migrants take, further expanding the irregular labor force, worsening the welfare and fiscal crisis, and thus exacerbating negative perceptions of immigrants and leading to stricter migration policy. This

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58 Lombardy-Diop and Romeo 2012
encourages illegal immigration, and immigrants are forced to enter the underground economy, thus perpetuating the cycle of the informal workforce and its effects on the overall Italian economy.

Although there exists a largely accepted imputation of immigrants as having stolen Italian jobs, an examination of domestic job seekers indicates that immigrant workers do not compete with Italians for low-level jobs. The Italian workforce is characterized by discrimination against women and the young, and there is not much advantage of being educated. What Italians assume to be a correlation between immigration and high unemployment is a false one: Italian youths’ job-refusal mentality is caused by subpar wages and working conditions. Upward occupational mobility in Italy is low, making Italian job seekers reluctant to accept jobs below expectations, thus allowing migrants to take the jobs considered too “low” for educated Italian youths.  

Of the hundreds of thousands of migrants entering Italy in the 1980s, few held a permit to work and stay. The lack of a national integration policy caused several problems for immigrant communities in Italy. The local experiences were based on the different levels of integration in each community, which is generally formed by nationality. The second generation, defined as children born and grown in the receiving society, has been largely neglected. Despite a growing population of foreign students from more than 170 different nationalities, most Italian schools don’t have an effective intervention plans, causing a large-scale effect of sub-par performance from immigrant children.  

\[\text{Reyneri 2010}\]

\[\text{Campani 1993}\]
Though most of the provisions of law 94/2009 were in good legal standing, the requirement that undocumented aliens (including students) must be reported to authorities is in violation of not only international law and the guidelines of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), but also the Italian Constitution, which mandates “(1) that the Italian legal system conform to generally recognized international law principles and (2) that schools are open to everyone and students have the right to obtain high grades… the CRC applies to all children in the state including visitors, refugees, children of migrant workers and those in the State illegally.” The rights of children are protected in the European Union’s directives, the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. This law deters undocumented children from attending school due to fear of deportation, which then feeds into a cycle of underperformance by those children. Furthermore, requiring teachers to report children will not benefit the identification of undocumented aliens, but only decrease class attendance for students who have no control over their condition.

There are several additional negative externalities of Law 94/2009’s prevention of undocumented students from attending classes. The policy-makers are condemning the undocumented youth to illiteracy and ignorance, which feeds into a cycle of under-qualification. The second generation of migrants would most likely resort to the black
market of employment, which results in poverty and minimal tax contributions. School is an essential part of a child’s development, specifically in socializing students to become contributing members of society, and providing a safe place for students to be while their parents work. These students would have nowhere to go, and no one to monitor them, so the new law would indirectly lead to increases in juvenile crime rates and teen pregnancy. Perpetuating the lucrative black market in Italy would encourage illegal migration into Italy.62

Media

A 2007 survey confirms increasing anti-immigrant sentiment in Italy, revealing that more than 94% of Italians thought immigration was a big problem, with 64% saying it was a big problem in Italy, and an overwhelming majority of Italians believed immigrants were a bad influence on Italy. Two years later, another survey reports an incredible eighty percent of Italians would like to see tighter restrictions on immigration. This sentiment was especially strong in the north, where three quarters of the population saw immigration as an issue, compared with around half of the Southern population thinking immigration is an issue. Italy is the only West European country where the majority of the population had a negative view of immigrants. It’s important to note that the negative views of immigration are equally directed towards African and Middle Eastern immigrants and Eastern European immigrants. Only around 20% of Italians saw immigration from the above-mentioned countries as a good occurrence for Italy.63 The Italian concern for immigration and the negative stigma attached to immigrants has contributed to the rising violence against foreigners in Italy since the turn of the century.

62 Komada 2011
63 Juliana Horowitz. Widespread Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Italy (Global Attitudes and Trends, Pew Research Center, 2010).
With more media coverage, the gap between reality and public discourse became more pronounced and radical, changing the public perception of foreigners.

In the past few decades, there has been an increase of African Italian authors and artists, coming from Africa and living and writing in Italian. The testimonies of refugees and migrants demonstrate the struggles of living and becoming integrated into Italian society. A documentary film, Como un uomo sulla terra (Like a Man on Earth 2008) demonstrates the Ethiopian migration through desert and sea to reach Italy. A collection of testimonies, the documentary received several prizes and became an icon of the protest against repressive policies of several African governments and Italian government. Volto Nascoto (Hidden Face), a well-known graphic comic strip, was published during the presentation of the “security package” law. The first of its kind to be set in Italian Africa since the end of World War II, the comic strip, later turned into a graphic novel, portrayed a fantasy of love affairs and creative politico-military situations. While the film showed the real struggle of the African migrants, the graphic novel showed a fantasy world that nonetheless exposed the Italians to the existence, if not the struggle of the migrants.64

64 Lombardy-Diop and Romeo 2012
Transition to the Arab Spring

As of 2007, a majority of the 680 million inhabitants in Africa lived under conditions of extreme poverty and insecurity; between 1993 and 2002, 27 out of 53 African states suffered from violent conflicts, and 2 years later, almost 18% of all African migrants were refugees, who establish around 1/3 of the global refugee population, a figure that is probably much larger today. Push factors include violent conflicts, human right violations, population pressure, lack of natural resources, and poverty. During this time, people were threatened by unemployment, so migration seemed a viable option to escape the lack of opportunities in their home countries. According to 2005 estimates from the International Organization on Migration, there were around 4.6 million Africans living in the EU, almost five times more than the United States 890,000. This is due to relatively more affordable transportation and established links due to former colonialism. While these numbers constitute an estimate of legal immigrants, the Migration Policy Institute posits there are “some seven to eight million irregular African migrants living in the EU, mostly in its Southern parts.” This data is skewed because legal migrants typically stay in the EU after their visas expire and they are no longer legal. West African migrants from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal are the most common sub-Saharan African migrants in Europe. Morocco’s popularity as a transit country increased tenfold between 2000 and 2005.65

The years leading up to the revolutions saw a number of policy changes. In 2002, stricter penalties were imposed on smugglers, to prevent risk of physical safety while preventing inhuman treatment and degradation. In November of 2004, the Hague Program acknowledged that the EU’s “insufficiently managed migration flows can result in humanitarian disasters.” The committee members expressed “utmost concerns about

the human tragedies that take place in the Mediterranean as a result of attempts to enter the EU illegally. In 2009, the Stockholm Program established a vision called GAMM (The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility), which established 4 pillars: legal migration and mobility, irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum policy, and maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility.

As a result of the Arab Spring, a revolutionary wave of protests that affected several African countries, a second influx of irregular migrants began in 2011. While most of the Western World publicly supported the revolutions, Italy and other concerned European countries soon curbed their enthusiasm, as thousands of irregular migrants including refugees and asylum seekers from North Africa and the Middle East began to flee political turmoil and the consequences of unstable governments. This wave was different from the previous inflows of migration: the major pull factor was no longer (ostensibly) employment, but political and religious asylum, and an overwhelming portion of the immigrant population was comprised of countries affected by the Arab Spring.

The sudden regime changes in the politically unstable countries resulted in xenophobia and conflict that prompted mass migration out of Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Libya, as well as several other countries. The difference in the percent change in foreign population is largely pronounced in the ISTAT data: 2010 showed a 9% increase, 2011 showed a 5% decrease, and since then, there has been a gradual increase. The spring gained momentum in 2012, which shows a 0.6% increase. 2013 showed an increase of

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8%, and 2014 showed a 14% increase from the year prior. These statistics are flawed, however, by the fact that most of the migrants stay in the Italian mainland illegally, and only a few legitimately claim asylum as Italian officials struggle to document and regulate the thousands of refugees.

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68 2011 Population Census (November 30, 2010)
Means of Migration

Desperate to escape the violence and general instability characteristic of most countries affected by the Arab Spring, migrants from Africa and the Middle East have been crowding into flimsy boats that would take them to Lampedusa, in Southern Italy. This journey has proven to be extremely dangerous, as several shipwrecks have occurred over the years; thousands of migrants have died of exhaustion, dehydration, and drowning. Just in the past few years, several shipwrecks have occurred in the middle of the Mediterranean Ocean and on the coast of Lampedusa. In 2011, a boat carrying migrants from Libya to Italy sank, killing at least 150 migrants. In 2013, another boat carrying Eritrean and Somalian migrants from Libya to Italy went down off the coast of Lampedusa, with more than double the casualties of the previous 2011 shipwreck, despite

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Figure 4: A Typical Boat Carrying Migrants Across the Mediterranean


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69 Borrelli and Stanford 2014
the best efforts of the Italian coast guard to rescue survivors. Around 700 more migrants are feared to have died in two separate shipwreck just a year later, and the most recent shipwrecks just last month have proven to be the most deadly, with a combined death toll estimated at more than 1,300 people.

The rising rates of death in these disastrous journeys portray both the desperation and eagerness of the refugees to leave their tumultuous countries, as well as the inadequacy and underfunding of the Italian Coast Guard. Even if the migrants make it to the Italian coast, the question of what happens to them afterwards is unclear. There are migrant camps that are financed through donations from locals and the merchants of markets. There are government-owned camps that also suffer from a lack of resources, because applicants for asylum have to wait almost two years to be considered.70

**Pushback Policies**

The burden of uncontrolled migration from Africa and the Middle East has been shared in countries along the north shore of the Mediterranean, especially Italy and Greece. Throughout the years, several measures have been taken to reduce irregular migration, especially since the formation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of Member States of the European Union (Frontex). One measure has been especially controversial amongst member states and human rights organizations: “push-back” operations, the interception of boats and forced return to the state from which they departed. This practice brings into question a number of considerations regarding international refugee law, but has been nonetheless implemented by several countries in the recent past.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has criticized Frontex in 2013 for its unclear role in migration control and its management of operations. Frontex has constantly denied responsibility, insisting that “the participating Member States are individually responsible for the conduct of operations”:

Since Frontex’ task is only to coordinate the cooperation of the EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, activities that can effect on a person’s rights can only be performed by the competent authorities from the Member States hosting or participating in the operation. Frontex’ staff members do not have executive powers in the fields of border control; all such powers are only in the hands of the Member States authorities. Hence, any person claiming that his/her fundamental rights were violated by an action from that authority may use both national and EU mechanisms to file a complaint.  

Some EU Member States have been implementing unilateral interdiction programs aimed at preventing vessels carry undocumented migrants from reaching the coast. Italy between 2009 and 2012 had a strict no tolerance policy, in which boats were intercepted and diverted back to Libyan and Tunisian coasts without any screening or assessment of situation. Part of this is due to a bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya in 2000, under which Libya agreed to collaborate to prevent irregular migration, and Italy provided technical assistance. Ineffective at first, the “Treaty of Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation” in 2008 strengthened this agreement, and the first push-back operation in 2009 resulted in the return of 471 undocumented migrants, and more importantly, a drop in the numbers of arrivals to Sicily and Lampedusa.

This practice was condemned in a 2012 judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi v Italy. The applicants, 11 Somalis and 13 Eritreans were intercepted and transported back to Libya, where they were at risk of

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71 Borrelli and Stanford 2014
72 Borrelli and Stanford 2014
torture or ill treatment, and subject of a collective expulsion. Although States have the right to control the entry of foreign nationals and deport illegal immigrants, this right is limited to the State’s international obligation, which includes human rights and international refugee law. International human rights law prohibits the transfer of individuals to another country where there exists a risk of violation of their fundamental human rights. In some cases, individuals are sent back to Libya and abandoned in the desert within Libyan territory, where they are likely to lose their lives or be found by the smugglers who coordinated their attempt to reach Europe. According to Human Rights Watch in 2010, “the most frequent abuses alleged by migrants…and often the most serious, occur when…they re-enter Libya after a failed boat departure, or when they are being expelled from the country.” This is certainly grounds for concern regarding treatment of migrants when they are returned to their state of origin. At this point, Italy was already seeking assistance from the European Union to alleviate pressures of immigration, cramming 6,500 undocumented migrants into reception centers intended for 3,000. Forcing the ships to return to their port of origin would require that migrants attempt the dangerous journey twice, sending migrants back to a place where they were not guaranteed human rights protection. This raises issues about the prohibition of wrongful transfer in light of international human rights law.

On August 2, 2011, the Italian Parliament ratified law 129/2011, which authorized the forcible removal of individuals who didn’t fulfill the requirements set out by the EU Directive of Free Movement and failed to leave the country within a certain time period. The law additionally incentivized regular migration by increasing the time limit for detention from six to eighteen months. The rising rates of death in these disastrous

73 Borrelli and Stanford 2014
74 Komada 2011
journeys portray both the desperation and eagerness of the refugees to leave their tumultuous countries, as well as the inadequacy and underfunding of the Italian Coast Guard. Right-wing opposition in Italy, namely Lega Nord (the Northern League), has voiced concern based on the presumption that humanitarian efforts would attract more immigrants and increase the death toll. This situation forms a catch-22, as the fear is not unfounded: more migrants are braving the dangerous journey each year, but without humanitarian aid, thousands of migrants would die at sea. In just the first half of 2015, according to the International Organization for Migration, more than 67,600 migrants attempted to travel across the Mediterranean to reach Europe.

After the migrants arrive at Lampedusa, they are placed in poorly supervised government-owned detention camps that suffer from a lack of resources, because applicants for asylum have to wait almost two years to be considered. The migrants who survive the dangerous voyage and reach Europe are often treated poorly- there have been reports of individuals being forced to strip naked in freezing conditions to be sprayed with disinfectant at reception centers in Lampedusa. Immigrants are forced to wait to receive their documents and learn Italian, a lengthy and difficult process. The asylum applications used to be considered and processed at Southern European ports after interception, but in recent years, some coastal states have begun to intercept vessels in international waters before bringing them back to their countries of origin.

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76 Brambilla et al 2015
79 Borelli and Stanford 2014
ITALY Mare Nostrum

In 2013, the Italian government established Operation Mare Nostrum to address the increase of migratory flows following the Arab Spring. The tragic shipwrecks off the coast of Lampedusa sparked the creation of this operation, which was an upgrade of Migration Flows Control activities carried out within the previously existing Italian Navy operation known as Constant Vigilance. The operation sought to combat human trafficking and improve maritime security, and several units were deployed to the Operation under the Italian Navy, which was in charge of monitoring and rescuing migrants in a sea-zone from Italian waters up to those of Libya. The objective was double sided- to serve humanitarian and security purposes. The operation was successful in saving the lives of some 150,810 people in just one year that Mare Nostrum had been operational. However, the costs associated with running Mare Nostrum were upwards of 9 million Euros a month, and Italy requested EU funding from the External Borders Fund. Most of the migrants traveling on these dangerous boats are from Libya (86%), Eritrea (23%), and to a lesser degree, Syria (17%).80 The humanitarian efforts of Italy and the EU have led some to believe that the Mare Nostrum operation served as a pull factor, unintentionally encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths. The Mare Nostrum Operation was terminated in 2014 as a result of costs and negative externalities, and Italy pushed for the EU to take charge of the operation in the frame of a burden-sharing logic.81

FRONTEX Operation Triton

Following the termination of Mare Nostrum, Frontex’s joint Operation Triton took over to do the work that Mare Nostrum had previously done.82 According to Paulina

80 Carrera et al 2012
81 Tazzioli 2016
82 Stanford and Borrelli 2014
Bakula of Information and Transparency at Frontex, the agency started the operation with the deployment of monthly open sea patrol vessels, coastal patrol vessels, aircrafts, and helicopters to assist with the rescue efforts in the Mediterranean. Frontex also sends five debriefing teams and two screening teams to work with intelligence collection about trafficking networks. The operational area of Triton covers Italian territorial waters, as well as the search and rescue zones of Italy and Malta. While initially, Operation Triton’s budget of 3 million euro per month was a third of Mare Nostrum’s 9 million, following the death of 750 migrants in April 2015, the EU made a commitment to increase the funding to match Mare Nostrum’s to prevent these tragic deaths. Despite this, Ms. Bakula made sure to emphasize that the primary focus of Operation Triton is border control and surveillance. Although Frontex has never had a mission of such size or complexity, the enhanced assistance from the EU had provided Italy some relief to implement a reform of its asylum system to cope with the pressures arising from the Arab Spring.

**EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia**

On May 18, 2015, the European Council approved the Crisis Management Concept for a military operation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to disrupt the patterns of smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. The operation, named after a baby rescued on a ship in August was a response to a series of mass drownings in April. The mandate calls for “the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean” by using “efforts to identify, capture, and dispose of vessels used or suspected of being used by smugglers.” This operation was different from previous CSDP operations in that it included a potentially openly coercive mandate to enforce “peace enforcement” type activities. The objective is not humanitarian rescue, but rather to prevent further loss at sea by focusing on the smugglers. This operation additionally

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83 Email Inquiry to Frontex, 2015
differentiates itself from others by explicitly melding the internal and external security agendas, “in the sense that an internal security and societal challenge is partially handled in terms of prevention and mitigation – through an action that takes place outside of the EU… and implies closer cooperation between the military operation and Freedom, Security, and Justice agencies such as EUROPOL or FRONTEX (including the latter’s own operation Triton which is active off the Italian coast.”

The Operation is laid out in three phases. The first phase involves gathering information on the human trafficking networks; the second phase involves boarding, searching, seizing and diverting vessels used in trafficking; and the third phase allows for the operation to take all necessary measures. Twenty-one countries have participated in the first phase of the operation, and Belgium, Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom are working together to achieve the second phase.84 The operation, as of January 2016, is in the second phase, to be carried out in two steps: 2A, operating in High Seas, and 2B, operating in Libyan Territorial Waters.

At the time of writing, no one can say how the Operation will conclude. The operation end date is one year after it becomes fully operational, and the Operation is scheduled to end in July 2016. However, a midway report written by Enrico Credendino, Operation Commander, reports a successful transition to phase 1A. With 16 ship and air assets, the operation was successful in the arrest of 46 suspected smugglers and the disposal of 67 boats.85 Given the possibility of peace enforcement actions, as of late September 2015, the operation had neither the compliance of the internationally recognized Libyan government nor a UN Security Council resolution.86 Credendino suggests a number of political and legal challenges be addressed before transitioning into

84 Tardy 2015
86 Tardy 2015
phase 2B of the Operation. Two significant changes have been observed in the migration flows since the inception of Operation Sophia: first, there has been a reduction in the number of migrants using the Mediterranean route to Italy, as opposed to other routes, down from almost 50% to 16%. For the first time in 3 years, there has been a 9% reduction in the migrant flow using the central route. Credendino suggests that this strives that the Operation has made are promising, and EUNavFor Med could play an important role in disrupting the smugglers’ business model, and decrease human trafficking between Libya and Italy.  

The Operation still faces several challenges as it completes the final months until its termination, mainly the non-consent of Libya’s authorities, on which the success of phase 2B and phase 3 rely. External to the legal issues, the mission is operationally challenging, as very few EU member states have the experience, skill, or will to militarily confront the smugglers. Additionally, the operation targets the traffickers, which leaves open to question what would happen to the migrants following the seizure of the ship, and how the disruption would shape their future. The success of this operation could be determined by a decreased ability for smugglers to bring refugees into international waters, resulting in a reduction of flows, and lead to a shift in the routes of migrants. 

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87 Credendino 2016
88 Tardy 2016
Effects of Migrant Crisis on Italian People and Politics

Opportunistic Migration

One interesting idea that has come up among researchers during the past several years is that the migration “crisis” currently occurring is not actually a crisis at all. Migration from Mediterranean Arab countries is nothing new, and by the time the Arab Spring started in late 2010, almost 62% of 8 million migrants were living in an EU member state. The period immediately preceding the revolts was one of intense migration, such that between 2001 and 2010, the number of emigrants to OECD countries increased from 2.5 million to almost 5 million. Data shows that as of 2012, the Arab revolts did not produce any change in legal migration to Europe. As for a surge in irregular border crossings, data shows that there was an increase in people who crossed the Mediterranean in 2011, but part of the unauthorized migrant population chose to cross in relation with an opportunity more than in response to a structural change.\(^{89}\) Young migrants “threatened by unemployment and lack of perspectives in their home country are eager to try their luck in what may appear to them at first sight as their ‘El Dorado.’”\(^ {90}\)

This is not to downplay the political situation in areas of Northern Africa and Syria- when the Arab Spring began, during the spring and summer of 2011 when more than one million people fled Libya to other countries. These were individuals seeking shelter from Libyan political turmoil, or migrant workers, or de facto refugees who were not registered as refugees in Libya. As a result of the revolutions, Tunisia and Libya became major points of departure for boats of migrants and refugees into Italy. In just 9 months of 2011, almost 43 thousand people were recorded as entering Italy through

\[^{89}\text{Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich,} Migration after the Arab Spring. (Migration Policy Center, European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies MPC Research Report 2012/09, 2012).}\]
\[^{90}\text{Kohnert 2007}\]
Lampedusa, compared to less than 5,000 in 2010 and less than 10,000 in 2009. While many interpret this influx as an increase in migration, Fargues and Fandrich suggest that the current revolutions have only rerouted existing flows from other routes. The crossings took place during a time when police forces were unorganized and coastal security was deficient, indicating that several migrants crossed in relation with the opportunity rather than the structural change that the revolutions brought. The migrants who would have taken alternatives routes such as crossing from other countries or from Morocco to Spain, took the opportunity to cross when security was weak. Many migrants, according to Fargues and Fandrich, are drawn to Europe for the same reasons that had been driving migrants out of Africa for at least a decade before the revolutions began: unemployment and underemployment especially for education youth, wage differentials, the attractiveness of European culture, the possibility of gaining skills and education, and family reunification.\(^{91}\)

**Media- the Border Stage**

It’s clear from the policies that were enacted that despite the increase in irregular migration, the EU’s policy focus has been inadequate. Although there has been a new emphasis on democracy-building, there have been no particularly new responses to migration drivers. Most of the suggested policy solutions have been focused on border control, even though at “emergency” summits have called for a more humanitarian response.\(^{92}\) Currently, rescue politics is dominated by the border-control and push-back policies. In what Tazzioli calls the “border stage,” media and governments highlight the status of refugees as merely shipwrecked people demanding to be rescued, ignoring them as subjects in need of protection. These migrants are not just shipwrecked lives, they had left their countries of origin as asylum seekers who would benefit from protection.

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\(^{91}\) Fargues and Fandrich 2012

\(^{92}\) Fargues and Fandrich 2012
Humanitarian agencies, migration agencies, and journalists continue to place attention on the scene of rescue, which includes the African point of departure the sea space between Libya and Italy, Sicily, and Lampedusa. This “stage” becomes a spectacle of migrant rescue, in which real-time politics governs most decisions made, and the politics of life takes exclusionary channels of a slow and convoluted asylum system. Between the containment policies and the staging of the scene of rescue, the latter is much more visible and heavily covered by media. By emphasizing securitization over humanitarianism through the transitions from Mare Nostrum to Operation Triton and Operation Sophia, European countries are choosing to disregard migrant’s statuses as displaced refugees of war, and are only addressing their status as shipwrecked individuals. Through addressing the smugglers in Operation Sophia and pushback policies, migrants are not, in fact, being helped.93

“Ideational Remittances”

Although it’s unclear if there was a substantial surge in immigration, and it is difficult to measure the extent to which the Arab Spring influenced a legal influx in migrations, emigration did play a role in the political and social movements that maintained the continuation of the uprisings. To consider the economic and political effects of emigration beans to consider social land ideational remittances as well as physical movements. A steady increase in education and media influence over the years has resulted in a spread of ideas that may have contributed to the protests that sparked the Arab Spring. Fargues and Fandrich bring up the idea of “emigration as an alternative to protest—an ‘exit’ instead of ‘voice’ response to discontent and frustration.” Key figures such as Egypt’s blogger Wael Ghoneim and Tunisia’s President Moncef Marzouki were migrants who returned to their countries of origins and subsequently helped to shape...

93 Tazzioli 2016
political opinions and ideologies. Migration has been shown to “help development processes because it provides the necessary resources to promote internal economic growth through remittances and investment and also because migrants can function as agents that insert new ideas in local cultures and promote the transfer of social and human capital from north to south.” These remittances are usually more positive than negative. In Cape Verde, for example, government policies took steps to establish mechanisms to facilitate money remittances and diaspora investment in the country. Despite these remittances, it’s questionable if these remittances are helpful in the development of economic stability for migrants, as they do not have access to labor mobility.

**Eurocentric Nature of Immigration Policies – a Continuity**

Several policy analysts have criticized the recent responses to the crisis as being self-serving in the way that they’ve been addressed. When the Arab Spring first began, the reaction of the EU was to consider the revolutions in the Mediterranean as a political opportunity for the Arab people, but more importantly, for European relations with the Mediterranean region. The policy options that have thus far been suggested are promoted by receiving countries, and express the interests of the more politically powerful states. These do not necessarily guarantee a “triple-win” outcome that benefits the sending and receiving countries as well as the migrants. Several EU and member states expanded focus from development to the promotion of democracy, outlined in a document called A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean

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94 Fargues and Fandrich 2012

Countries, offering a “more-for-more” approach that incentivized democratic transitions for financial support from the EU.

One such proposal was the EU-Tunisia Task Force, which would provide 4 billion Euros to support democratic transition between 2011 and 2013. The EU-Jordan and EU-Egypt Task Force followed suit in 2012. Other measures included the Support for Partnership Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) program that allocated 350 million Euros to democratic transition and sustainable growth, the EU budget for the Neighborhood, which increased by 40%, and assistance for reform in Morocco was increased by 20%. While these appeared to be motivated purely by a European desire to promote equality, an underlying expectation of democracy was that stability in the region would lead to less migration, which supports the idea that European countries are primarily interested in securitization, not humanitarianism.

This is further demonstrated in Italy’s signing of a Cooperation Accord with the rebel National Transitional Council of Libya, before the creation of an official government. Clauses of this agreement included the deportation of irregular immigrants without proper status, and a Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya was signed to increase Libyan border control. A similar such agreement was settled between Tunisia and Italy in April 2011, to counter illegal immigration and strengthen collaboration between police forces and increased attention to repatriations. While migration is not a long-term solution to the revolutions of the Arab Spring, it may have been necessary as part of the response.96 Italy’s agreement with the rebel group in Libya demonstrates the EU and Member State’s foremost concern for securitization, a reminder of a not-so-distant past when funding for border control in countries ruled by undemocratic rulers meant more money for police control over citizens. Border control

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96 Fargues and Fandrich 2012
was directly related to the repression of citizens and the deportation of citizens that violated human rights.

Some EU countries participated in a special partnership (SP) approach called partnerships for mobility (PfM) to promote “good governance, regional integration, technology and standards convergence, the goal of a knowledge based society, poverty alleviation and development, as well as security/stability.” The provision included references to effective management of migration, in order to provide better opportunities for regular migration. This defined exactly what African partners would need to do to benefit from visa facilitation and “co-development,” and stressed the importance of a well-defined readmission agreement. The wording of such PfMs shows the tit-for-tat conditionality that characterizes several of the EU’s approaches to migration. These provisions often include strictly-defined readmission agreements, but don’t have improved labor mobility for migrants, resulting in a very unbalanced deal.97

EU priority is to prevent large numbers of irregular migrants from arriving in the EU. In response to the 650,000 individuals who had fled Libya, the EU repatriated 50,000 of them. The EU opened regional protection programs (RPPs) in North Africa to address refugee crisis management outside of Europe, to be closer to the refugees’ countries of origin. Although the EU stressed the importance of resettling refugees, only around 700 were resettled in 2011. Cecilia Malmstrom, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, stated:

No European State took any serious initiative to provide shelter on its own soil to those in need of international protection… Instead of solidarity among Member States, France and Italy quarreled about possible risks for their internal security, with France even reinforcing controls at the internal

97 Pina-Delgado 2013
border with Italy. So, instead of reaching out and protecting, the EU Member States were inward-looking and security oriented.98

When the October 2013 crisis occurred, Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta stated that men, women, and children who died during the accident would be posthumously named Italian citizens.99 While the gesture is thoughtful, it suggests that a migrant's life is only regarded valuable after it has been devalued by restrictive border control policies. One point of continuity between the early migrations between North Africa and Europe has been the Eurocentric nature of the policies that have been implemented thus far. Italian immigration policy (and policy elsewhere in the European Union) has been a constant struggle between humanitarianism and securitization.

While discursive trends have been concerned with humanitarian efforts, the prevailing priority in policy making throughout Italian history has used the emergency factor as an excuse to further its own agenda. This has been shown in migrations prior to the Arab Spring, when Europe needed the cheap labor following the World War period.100 Kohnert even asserts that the EU’s policies of deterrence and zero-migration in the 1990s, encouraged irregular immigration, smuggling, marginalization, and exploitation of migrants.101 The policies introduced by EU countries following the Arab Spring reaffirm the long-standing external of EU migration policies as being focused on securitization and economic boon. This is acutely demonstrated in that of the four pillars of the GAMM framework established in 2009, most countries are primarily concerned with preventing irregular migration.102 These policies show that in both cases the party

98 Fargues and Fandrich 2012
99 Brambilla et al 2015
100 De Haas 2008
101 Kohnert 2007
102 Fargues/Fandrich 2012
with more education and resource endowment has the most to gain from a bilateral agreement.
CONCLUSION

As this analysis has demonstrated, historical and current migratory trends show that despite a long history of the presence of Africans in Italy, migrants have long faced both implicit and explicit racism and discrimination. Italy’s outward dedication to “esterofilia”, love of all things foreign, is in constant contrast with the way that migrants are treated. The two different waves of immigration are crucial to understanding the history of immigrant reception and how public perception of African migrants has developed during the past forty years. The media portrayal of Italian government depicts a public that cares about migrants, a “savior” Italy that saves thousands of shipwrecked migrants, and a promising future awaiting the migrants. The reality shows an Italy that is increasingly xenophobic, an intentional overlook of corrupt governance in some African countries, and shrinking opportunities for migrants who manage to stay in Europe. The policies implemented throughout the history of migration in Italy demonstrate that the deep-rooted intolerance exists, but this issue is not limited in scope to just Italian policy, but implicates a larger issue in European policy-making.
WORKS CITED


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